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Résumé 
Le récent renforcement des systèmes de protection des droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI) des 
pays en voie de développement, et en particulier de ceux à capacité technologique croissante, 
s’explique par leur volonté d’accroître les transferts technologiques intrants. Nous tentons dans 
cette étude d’évaluer empiriquement l'impact des DPI sur le commerce de connaissances 
désincorporées. Pour se faire, nous exploitons les recettes françaises en technologie au niveau 
industriel pour la période 1994-2000. Nous constatons que les DPI ont un impact positif sur les 
échanges internationaux en technologie. Néanmoins, nos résultats prouvent que cet impact diffère 
selon le niveau de revenu et la capacité technologique des pays d’accueil. Les effets des DPI 
semblent différer entre industries : une protection plus élevée de la propriété intellectuelle n’attire 
pas les contrats de connaissance désincorporés dans les industries intensives en R&D, 
contrairement aux industries à intensité moyenne. Finalement, nous rapportons des résultats 
sensiblement différents des enquêtes industrielles précédentes (Mansfield et alii, 1968 ; Levin et 
alii, 1987 ; Cohen et alii, 2000) quant à la sensibilité des industries aux brevets pour approprier 
l’innovation. 
 
 
Mots Clés : Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle, Transfert International de Technologie, Protection 
des brevets. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Developing countries, and particularly, those with a growing technological capacity, expect 
foreign technology transfers to increase when strengthening their intellectual property protection 
(IPR) rights. This paper evaluates empirically the impact of IPR on disembodied knowledge trade. 
It presents an exploration on Bilateral French Technology Receipts at the industry level for the 
period 1994-2000. Two main findings stem from our analysis. First, It is found that IPR affects 
positively international knowledge contracting. Nevertheless, our findings show that the impact of 
IPR protection differs according to countries’ income level and technological capacity. Stronger 
IPR rights can deter technology contracting in developing economies. Second, the effects of IPR 
protection are found to differ across industries. Stronger protection is found to be irrelevant to 
attract knowledge contracting in R&D-intensive industries, contrarily to middle R&D-intensive 
industries. Lastly, our findings on industries’ sensitivity to foreign IPR protection differ from the 
results reported by survey studies (Mansfield et alii, 1968; Levin et alii, 1987; Cohen et alii, 2000) 
concerning the relative importance of IPR protection across industries to appropriate innovation.  
 
 
Key Words: Intellectual Property Rights, international technology transfer, patent protection. 
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Introduction 
 
Technology can be transferred across countries through many channels such as imports of capital 
goods (embodied technologies), direct investment, technology licensing and joint ventures. A 
priori, production modes involving a direct transfer of tacit knowledge towards third-local parties, 
such as patent licensing (or arms’ length contracting, R&D assistance, R&D delocalization), are 
affected by the risk of knowledge dissipation in foreign markets (Glass and Saggi, 1998; 
Vishwasrao, 1994). The strength of intellectual property rights (hereafter IPR) constitutes 
consequently a major determinant for technology-exporting firms to appropriate additional returns 
to Research and Development in foreign markets (Glass and Saggi, 1998; Yang and Maskus, 
2001b). Intellectual property protection by fostering technology transfer by foreign firms as well as 
innovation by local firms, should affect in turn, economic growth and welfare in the reforming 
country (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Gould and Grouben, 1996; Maskus, 2001).  
 
The economic literature remains however largely inconclusive on the economic effects of 
strengthening IPR protection worldwide. Much controversy remains concerning the extent to 
which stronger IPR actually stimulate international technology transfer. Different theoretical 
arguments have supported both sides of the debate on IPR reform.  
 
On the one hand, stronger IPR protection may stimulate further knowledge-based transactions by 
expanding market potential through the displacement of imitators (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; 
Smith, 1999). IPR reduce transaction costs and costs related to contract enforcement between 
parties (the premium paid to employees to not defect is reduced) and increase proprietor’s 
bargaining power (Yang and Maskus, 2001b). On the other hand, tighter IPR may reduce 
knowledge transfer obtained through imitation (Glass and Saggi, 2002; Helpman, 1993). Further, 
by reducing local imitation risk stronger IPR may induce a weaker local presence of innovators 
both through multinational activity and licensing, and increase exports as a serving-market mode 
(Glass and Saggi, 2002; Helpman, 1993). Lastly, knowledge-based transactions may also contract 
since the increased market power allows innovators to commercialize technologies at higher 
prices. Therefore, technology transfer through licensing might be reduced to the extent that there 
would be fewer new technologies available for commercialization. 
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In spite of its relevance however, the empirical evaluation of the impact of IPR on technology 
transfer, and particularly, on international technology contracting remains an understudied area.2 
Bringing empirical evidence on this matter is particularly urgent for developing countries as a 
considerable number of them have dramatically reformed their IPR regimes since the half 1980s.3 
The creation, notably, of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs) at the 
Uruguay Round (1986-1994), raised a number of questions on the pertinence of harmonizing the 
standards of IPR worldwide and the resulting gains for the developing world in terms of innovation 
and technology transfer. Are stronger intellectual property rights an adequate strategy to stimulate 
knowledge transfer to developing nations? Moreover, is strengthening patent protection an 
efficient way to promote innovation in these regions?  For developing countries, resolving these 
questions is essential in order to assess the implications in the process of technology catching-up 
and the design of complementary policies to IPR reforms (Primo Braga et al 2000; Siebeck et al 
1990).  
 
This study provides new evidence regarding the effects of patent protection on international 
knowledge transfer. It presents an empirical analysis on Bilateral French Technology Receipts at 
the industry level for the period 1994-2000. Technology receipts concern fees related to patent and 
trademark licensing, arm’s length contracting, technical assistance and know-how alliances, as 
well as fees related to foreign R&D activities made by French firms. The data set is a cross section 
of 21 countries and 20 sectors. Our contribution is twofold. First, following theoretical predictions, 
our study presents evidence on a differentiated impact of IPR across countries. Countries’ income 
level and technological capacity affect unambiguously the extent of technology contracting. 
Second, an examination of the effects of patent protection is conducted in an industry-basis. To the 
extent that imitation threat varies across sectors and consequently the sensitivity to tighter IPR 
protection (Cohen et al 2000; Levin et al 1987; Mansfield et al 1968), a differentiated impact of 
IPR on trade knowledge is identified across industries.  
 
Our findings show that IPR does have a positive impact in average on international knowledge 
contracting. Nevertheless, our results cast some doubts about the efficacy of stronger patent 
                                                 
2 Contrarily, the question of spillovers related to disembodied knowledge embedded in international patents, has 
become recently an issue of intensive research (Guellec and Van Pottelsbergue 2001).  
3 For a survey of the literature concerning the economic effects of international harmonization of intellectual property 
rights, see Siebeck et al (1990) or Maskus (2000).  
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protection to enhance technology markets in developing countries, and particularly, in R&D 
intensive industries. IPR is found to deter technology contracting in emerging countries at small 
levels of reforms. At stronger level of IPR protection, technology contracting seems to react 
positively to IPR reforms. Furthermore, contrarily to common expectations stronger protection 
appears as irrelevant to attract knowledge contracting in R&D-intensive industries; although IPR is 
found to play a significant role in middle R&D-intensive industries. Lastly, in terms of knowledge 
transfer, our results differ from the conclusions offered by several survey studies on the relative 
importance of patents as appropriability means (Levin et al 1987). In terms of knowledge 
contracting, industries à priori sensitive to patents, do not necessarily answer to stronger foreign 
patent protection. The degree of response to foreign IPR will depend on industries’ propensity to 
commercialize their intellectual assets. In other words, the effects of IPR should be conditioned by 
the use of IPR markets by firms (industries). 
 
In conclusion, this work pointed out the limited role of foreign IPR protection to stimulate 
knowledge-based transactions overseas. In order to strengthen the incentives for knowledge 
contracting brought by the improved legal framework, complementary policies should be 
considered in alleviating other obstacles to the development of technology markets. The removal 
of barriers (institutional, economical, financial, etc.) both to innovation and technology markets 
should strengthen the receptivity of host countries to technology collaborations with foreigners. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the conceptual framework and reviews the 
empirical literature related to IPR and international economic transactions. Section 2 describes the 
data used in the study, the specification and methodology guiding our empirical analysis. Section 3 
provides our empirical results. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications. 
 
1. Intellectual Property Rights and Knowledge Transfer 
 
The economic literature remains inconclusive about the effects of stronger IPR on knowledge 
transfer (either by foreign direct investment, trade or licensing). Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence suggesting that IPR protection constitutes a main determinant in technology transfer 
decisions by multinational firms (Maskus, 2001). 
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According to different survey studies (Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Mansfield, 1994), multinational 
firms report that intellectual property protection is à priori, a major condition when transferring 
knowledge assets cross borders through licensing to third parties.4 Under a weak IPR regime the 
provision and sharing of tacit knowledge and intellectual assets with domestic firms becomes too 
risky when the threat of imitation posed by third firms (or partners) is strong (Markusen, 1998). As 
explained by Maskus (1998) and Yang and Maskus (2001b), in the presence of weak patents, 
problems of transacting information with licensing, such as the non-excludability property of new 
knowledge, informational asymmetry, imitation risk and transfer costs, could provide an 
internalization motive for foreign direct investment (Markusen, 1995; Pitkethly, 2001). In addition, 
the level of IPR influences firms’ choice concerning the technologies’ vintage to commercialize in 
the foreign markets.5  
 
Nevertheless, the theoretical literature provides mixed conclusions on the effects of stronger IPR 
on technology-transfer (FDI, trade, licensing or joint-ventures). A group of studies in the line of 
partial equilibrium models has investigated the implications of extending IPR to southern countries 
on international production transfer, innovation and global welfare (Chin and Grossman, 1988; 
Deardorff, 1992; Helpman, 1993). By raising the costs of Southern imitation, stronger IPR in the 
South slows down this process of transfer of production to the South. The impact of IPR on other 
modes of technology transfer is however not clear: technology transfer through direct investment 
or licensing may increase or decrease.6 Helpman (1993) concludes that a tighter IPR in the South 
may provoke a reduction of direct investment and an increase of imports which in turn would deter 
innovation and lower global welfare.7 A similar pessimistic view is offered by Glass and Saggi 
(2002): the reallocation of production to the North (contraction of FDI) would provoke a scarcity 
of resources, reducing the resources available for innovation (R&D).8 In conclusion, these models 
suggest that technology exporter countries (North) may gain from stronger protection IPR whereas 
developing countries will likely loss in the absence of innovation gains (Chin and Grossman, 1988, 
                                                 
4 However, this finding depends on the industry or nature of the technology. In Mansfields’ study (1994), U.S. firms in 
Chemicals and electronics industries appeared to place a greater emphasis on intellectual property protection, whereas 
firms in the metals and transportation industries were seen to be less reliant on it.   
5 Fosfuri (2000) shows that under weak IPR protection, the age of technologies is chosen strategically to prevent 
imitation. 
6 Furthermore, the impact of stronger IPR on knowledge transfer and global welfare in these models depend on the 
initial mode of technology transfer relating the North and South (Lai, 1998). 
7 Accordingly, a stronger IPR might lead to a two-folded inefficiency in the short run: an allocative inefficiency 
derived from monopoly pricing (rent transfer effect); and a productive inefficiency stemming from a reallocation of 
production from South to North (Helpman, 1993).  
8 In the opposite, Lai (1998) argues that stronger IPR could accelerate multinational activity and innovation in a 
context of technology transfer North-South through foreign direct investment (FDI) and weak local imitation. 
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Deardorff, 1992).9 Helpman (1993) shows that welfare losses may arise due to monopoly pricing, a 
higher dependence of imports and loss of variety. 
 
A more optimistic vision prevails about the impact of stronger IPR on licensing activity. By 
improving the legal framework for the enforcement of contracts (patent licensing, arm’s length 
contracting, etc.) stronger IPR may reduce the costs of technology transfer, stimulating technology 
contracting in reforming countries. Stronger patent protection lowers the costs of enforcing 
contracts (i.e. monitoring, litigation costs, etc.) mitigating the costs of technology transfer (Caves 
et al 1983; Contractor, 1980).10 Therefore the rent share accruing to the licensor rises with patent 
strength, raising the returns to licensing (Yang and Maskus, 2001a; 2001b). By modifying 
imitation costs and reducing consequently licensing costs, stricter IPR would increase the 
licensor’s profit by two main effects: a higher economic return from licensing (“the size effect”) 
and a superior rent share (“the distribution effect”). In turn, a higher rent stemming from licensing 
increases the return to R&D and the incentives to innovate (assuming that southern firms do not 
innovate).11 Furthermore, by reducing the relative transaction costs, i.e. fixed costs of reaching and 
enforcing licensing contracts, stronger patent rights may shift incentives toward licensing away 
from FDI or trade (Fosfuri, 2000; Maskus et al 2003; Vishwasrao, 1994).  
 
Nevertheless, the economic gains previously mentioned should be confronted to the potential 
detrimental effects of stronger IPR (i.e. patent protection) on technology contracting. An increase 
in patent protection may have offsetting effects upon licensing propensity (Arora et al 2004). On 
the one hand, stronger patent protection increases the efficiency of licensing contracts, but on the 
other hand, also enhances the value of the innovation itself and thus, raises the opportunity cost of 
licensing. Patent effectiveness is likely to increase patent propensity, but may also decrease the 
share of patented innovations that are licensed (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2004). Nonetheless, the 
impact of patent reinforcing on licensing behavior can be conditioned by the degree of firms’ 
                                                 
9 A different view is presented by Diwan and Rodrick (1995). He shows that welfare gains emanating from increased 
local innovation may arise in southern countries from strengthening IPR in the case of different demands between the 
North and the South.  
10 In a model of asymmetric information and imitation threat, Gallini and Wright (1990) show that licensors sacrifice 
rents in order to preclude imitation. Markusen (1998) show that a strengthening of protection reduces the premium that 
firms have to pay to their employees to deter them from disclosing their knowledge to rival firms. 
11 In addition, the rate of innovation is strengthened as more resources are available up in the North for innovation 
investment given the more efficient allocation of production in the two regions. A similar analysis is provided by 
Maskus et al (2003). 
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autonomy (e.g. production and commercialization capabilities) to bring innovation to the market 
(Arora et al 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2004). 12 
 
Stronger levels of IPR (e.g. stronger patent protection) might actually discourage knowledge 
diffusion (Machlup and Penrose, 1950). Stronger patents might reduce technology transfer through 
formal contracting because of the market-power effect can dominate the increase on economic-
returns (e.g. through licensing) brought by the stronger protection. Stronger patents might deter the 
development of technology markets as well as industries’ rate of innovation (Gallini, 1992; Gallini 
and Wright, 1990; Mergers and Nelson, 1995; Scotchmer, 1991):  they make firms to incur in 
higher technology acquisition costs due to the increased market power of innovators and the 
amplified protection set over a larger rank of technologies (Bessen and Maskin, 1999; McCalman, 
2001). Furthermore, stronger IPR could induce less R&D efforts by monopolistic firms leading to a 
lower rate of innovation and diffusion (Gallini, 1992).13 Since stronger IPR protection reduces 
threats from potential rivals (who could imitate or invent around existing products), less incentive 
exists to upgrade existing intellectual property or to develop new varieties. To the extent that 
stronger IPR may slow down the pace of innovation, there would be fewer new technologies 
available for licensing.14 It should also be noted that the effectiveness of patents to stimulate 
technology-contracting, may vary across industries and depends on the kind of innovation 
(industrial process and product innovation). As shown by several survey studies (Cohen et al., 
1997; Cohen et al 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1968), patent protection is not the only or 
even primary source of appropriating rents to innovation:  first-mover advantages, secrecy and lead 
time constitute privileged strategies in an important number of industries.15 
 
Lastly, technology licensing must also be considered in relation to alternative modes of technology 
transfer, such as exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) and joint ventures. Stronger IPR may 
increase or decrease licensing because stronger IPR may reduce or increase the other kinds of 
technology transfer activities. Reforms in intellectual property regimes may make one form of 
                                                 
12 A higher autonomy might more likely lead to contractions of licensing intensity under stronger patents, whereas the 
existence of (local or foreign) firms endowed with superior capabilities (e.g. commercialization capabilities) might 
stimulate technology licensing. 
13 As explained by Takalo and Kammianen (2000) stronger patent protection could delay the commercialization of 
innovations as firms might find more profitable to keep exploiting current technologies. 
14 By increasing the costs of innovation and patents enforcement (imitation and inventing-around costs, litigation 
expenses, etc.), stronger patent rights might block incremental innovation, particularly in industries where innovation is 
mainly based on cumulative innovation (Scotchmer; 1991).  
15 For instance, to appropriate returns from product innovation lead time is the main appropriation strategy in basic-
chemicals, cosmetics, computers, semi-conductors, automobile and aero-spatial (Yale Survey).   
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technology transfer more attractive than another and thus induce substitutions among the different 
modes of transfer. However, some studies suggest that the economic return effect on rent share and 
R&D on patent licensing might be more significant than the ones generated on alternative 
production modes (Yang and Maskus, 2001a; Maskus et al 2003).16   
 
The contribution of empirical works evaluating the relationship between IPR in southern countries 
and technology transfer remains also inconclusive. In fact, most of studies have particularly 
focused on the role of stronger IPR on trade (embodied knowledge) and FDI (Maskus, 2000; 
2001). Regarding the impact on trade, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) show that weak protection of 
IPR may reduce expected levels of trade. Further, IPR seems to play a role to stimulate economic 
transactions in larger income countries, whereas for small countries the effect might be non-
significant (Ferrantino, 1993; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995). Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and 
Primo Braga and Fink (2000), show that the impact of IPR on trade may varies significantly across 
industries. Exports in patent-sensitive or high-R&D intensive sectors may be in fact not correlated 
to the strength of foreign patent protection. Smith (1999) finds also similar results.  
 
Concerning FDI and licensing, conclusions are less clear-cut. Studies on FDI suggest however, a 
negative although weak relationship between a lax patent regime and the volume of American or 
European Direct Investment, particularly in R&D-intensive sectors (Lee and Mansfield, 1996; 
Maskus, 1998).17 In the opposite, Kumar (1996) shows that  the intensity in R&D by foreign 
affiliates and the extent of R&D collaboration, appear both insensitive to patent protection in 
developing economies. Regarding licensing, the few empirical studies available offer also mixed 
results. Using cross-sectional data on the ratio U.S. receipts of unaffiliated royalties and licensing 
fees, Contractor (1980) finds that the patent intensity of a nation (defined as patents in force) 
attracts licensing volumes. In a similar study, Ferrantino (1993) shows that the adhesion of the 
countries to the convention of Paris (in combination with long duration of the patents), seems to 
have stimulated receipts and royalties volumes from licensing coming from the United States. 
More recent works have shown that the effect of stronger IPR on international licensing depends 
on the imitative capabilities of host countries. Smith (2001) has found that in countries where 
                                                 
16 Relative to other entry modes, the cost of FDI and licensing relative to imports decreases as IPR protection 
increases, allowing a better exploitation of production costs differentials. Firms might shift towards licensing at 
stronger levels of patent protection as the risks of defection are reduced further and differential production costs are 
not largely dissimilar (Fosfuri, 2000; Viswharao, 1999). 
17 Lee and Mansfield (1996) report a negative effect of lax IPR regimes on different forms of direct investment. 
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imitative capabilities are high (low), stronger patent rights may stimulate (deter) licensing to 
unaffiliated foreign firms. In a panel of 26 technology recipient countries covering three time 
periods (1985, 1990, and 1995), Yang and Maskus (2001a) find a positive significant effect on 
receipts of royalties and licensing fees from unaffiliated sources. A positive effect is also found on 
receipts of fees from unaffiliated sources relative to exports.18 On the other hand, a number of 
other studies cast doubts on the link between patent strength and the extent or form of international 
technology licensing. Smith (2001) finds similarly that US firms are more likely to export or 
directly manufacture rather than license technology in countries with weak patent regimes. Fosfuri 
(2004) similarly does not find that patent protection significantly affects the extent or composition 
of technology flow (as joint-venture, direct investment or licensing) in the chemical sector. 
 
2. An Exploration on French Technology Receipts 
 
This study evaluates empirically whether national differences in IPR affect the extent of 
technology contracting cross borders. For this purpose, we explore data on international 
technology services as a measure of disembodied knowledge contracting. We present an empirical 
exploration on Bilateral French Technology Receipts at the industry level over a set of 21 countries 
destinations, 20 sectors (NACE transformed to ISIC 2 digit level, Rev. 3), over a period of six 
years (1994-2000). Data is from the Report on International Technology Transfers (Rapport sur 
les Transferts Techniques Internationaux) published by the National Institute of Intellectual 
Property (INPI). Our dependant variable represents the total of receipts related to technology 
services and contracting (flows) received by French firms. It includes the following aggregates 
reported in an industry basis (total affiliated and non-affiliated firms): i) Royalties and licensing 
fees concerning patent licensing of technologies; ii) Trademarks licensing fees and technical 
assistance; iii) Engineering and know-how services provided by French firms; iv) R&D services 
cross-borders and R&D expenditures overseas by French affiliates. 
 
Table (1) displays the distribution of total receipts in technology contracting by technology 
services (as reported in current euros). As noted, patent licensing (product and industrial 
processes), followed by technical assistance stand as the two main technology services exported by 
                                                 
18 Applying the elasticity found (5.3) to changes in patent rights and using existing fees for 1995, Maskus (2001) found 
that licensing activity could significantly increase in some countries. For instance, large responses were reported for 
Korea, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia. 
 Page 11 
French Firms. Patents and patent licensing represent the main growing receipt in the French 
Technology Balance of Payments (20.4% of total technology receipts in 1993, 35.5% in 2000), 
followed by technical assistance (31.3% in 1986 and 40% in 2000). 
 
====TAB 1=== 
 
Looking at the distribution of technology receipts by destination (tab. 2), some distinguishing 
features of French technology contracting can be noticed. While European Union (EU) and OECD 
countries remain the two main zones of French contracting overseas (in 2000, 40.5% of technology 
receipts came from EU, and 50%, from OECD-countries others than EU, INPI), contracting with 
southern countries shows differentiated trends. Overall, the rest of the world countries accounted 
for 6.4% of technology receipts in 2000 (1.8% OPEP countries, 1.2% Eastern Europe).  
 
====TAB 2==== 
 
====TAB 3==== 
 
The largest amount of receipts in this group comes from Mexico, South Africa and Brazil. Indeed, 
these countries, and particularly, Brazil and Mexico (EU countries like Ireland, Portugal etc.) 
showed an increasing share in technology receipts flows over the period 1994-2000 under study 
(tab. 2). On the other hand, countries like India, Singapore and China reduced their contribution 
relative to other countries.19 Different factors can explain these cross-country differences in 
knowledge contracting by French Firms (absorption capacity, infrastructure, market potential 
regulatory framework on FDI, licensing and trade, etc.). 
 
National differences in terms of patent protection, as a measure of IPR protection, are reported in 
table (3). The protection offered may differ along several dimensions. IPR laws across countries 
differ with respect to coverage (according to the nature of innovation, product and process 
innovations; novelty criteria, etc.), and particularly, respect to coverage protection in certain 
                                                 
19 Our data under study concerns only technology receipts disaggregated at the industry level for a representative 
group of countries. Our study evaluates in this perspective, the incidences of national differences in IPR to attract 
technology contracting mainly in a cross-sectional dimension. Time dimension is taking into account with two changes 
of the IPR index. We acknowledge that having more refined data at the contract or firm level on royalties and licensing 
fees would provide a richer analysis on firms’ strategies to foreign IPR. 
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technological areas (such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and food products, e.g. India, Brazil, 
etc.).20 IPR laws differs also with respect to the duration of protection (20 years according to 
TRIPs), the date of patent life begins (application, grant date, publication)21, and particularly, in 
terms of enforcement procedures (i.e. preliminary injunctions, the burden of proof, etc.). 
 
Our testing explanatory variable indicating the strength of IPR protection by country is the Ginarte 
and Park Index (1997), a common measurement of patent protection developed by Juan Cinarte 
and Walter G. Park (1997). The index of strength of IPR ranges from 0 to 5, with higher numbers 
reflecting stronger levels of protection and is reported each five year since 1965. It incorporates 
five aspects of patent laws: extent of coverage, membership in international patent agreements, 
provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. The relative 
superiority of this index relative to alternative measures (Rapp and Rozeck, 1990; Sherwood, 
1997) relies in its greater variability across countries and time, since it describes more in detail the 
IPR standards than the one used by Rapp and Rozeck (1990) and Sherwood (1997).22 
 
===TAB 4=== 
 
Finally, remarkable differences in the intensity of technology contracting cross borders exist also 
across industries (tab. 4). Only 5 sectors represent 77% of the total receipts in technology services 
exported by French Firms overseas: Software and Computer Materials, Pharmaceuticals (23%), 
Fine-Chemicals (14%), tires and rubber industries, and Engineering and Technical Studies (6%). 
As suggested by number of studies, R&D intensive industries have been found to participate more 
fiercely in international markets (Amable and Verspagen, 1995).23 Finally, as noted previously, the 
propensity to rely on IPR, i.e. patent, trademark, etc. and other means to appropriate the returns to 
R&D (first mover advantage, secret, etc.), differs largely across sectors (Mansfield, 1968; Levin et 
                                                 
20 Regarding patent protection on product innovation in pharmaceuticals, South Korea passed new legislation in 1987, 
Indonesia, Bulgaria and Chili in 1991, Thailand, Taiwan, Rumanian, Russia and Ukraine in 1992, Turkey in 1991, 
Brazil in 1996, etc. (Siebeck et al. 1990). 
21 For instance, some countries measure patent life from the patent application filing date (Nigeria, Jordan, Thailand), 
while other measure if from the grant date (Pakistan, Mexico, Portugal Canada, Iceland, USA). 
22 The difference between this indicator and the Rapp and Rozeck index (1990) is that Ginarte and Park use a more 
comprehensive set of criteria to build a score  that weights a subset of conditions such as the availability of different 
IPR (patents, trademarks, utility models, etc.), the coverage by technology area (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, etc.), the 
duration of protection, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection and very 
important, it considers if the country has or not enforcement measures.  
23 Previous works have identified significant differences across industries in the way firms’ exploit knowledge assets 
cross-borders (Vishwashrao, 1994; Markusen, 1995; Fosfuri, 1999). 
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al., 1987; Cohen et al., 1997; Cohen et al 2000): pharmaceuticals, chemicals, software and 
computing industries being the sectors wherein patents are considered as the principal mean to 
appropriate returns to R&D; followed by the instruments industry, the radio, television and 
communication equipment industries.  
 
3. An Empirical Model 
 
To explore the impact of the strength IPR protection on knowledge flows we apply a reduced 
econometric equation of technology transfer inspired from the theoretical works by Glass and 
Saggi (1998) and Yang and Maskus (2001a). It relates technology trade to several countries’ factor 
endowments, notably in technology and labor resources, market size and openness and patent 
protection (Baltagi, 2001; Smith, 2001). This form expresses the technology flows as follows: 
 
                            Yit=  GDPCitβ0LABitβ1IPR it-5β2 HSitβ3OPit β4                                        (2)            
              
where Yit is the  flow of receipts in technology services from knowledge-recipient country i at the 
industry level received by France as the technology exporter country. GDPCit is the gross domestic 
product per capita, LABit represents labor endowment relative to countries’ population; IPRit  is the 
level of patent protection of the host country i at time t (Ginarte and Park, 1997).24 HSit is a proxy 
for human capital (the average number of years of formal schooling equal or over the age 15). As 
measure of a countries’ market openness (OP) we use the ratio of total trade (exports + imports) 
relative to GDP. Monetary values are in constant USD 1995. In order to control for countries’ 
technological capacity we include the total number of patents applied (PAT) by the country i in 
period t, at the USPTO (United States Patent Office).  
 
 
The empirical specification is derived by taking natural logs of Eq. (1).  
 
ln(Yit) =β0 ln (GDPCit) + β1 ln(LABit) + β2 ln (IPRi) + β3 ln (HSit) + β4 ln (OPit)  
                   + β4 ln (PATit) + β5 (IPR it*D) + uit                                                 (3) 
                                                 
24 In order to avoid multicollinearity between the IPR protection index and economic development variables, we use 
the Ginarte and Park index, 5 year period lagged. That is, for 1994-1996 flows we use the 1990 G&P index, and for 
1997-2000, we use the 1995 G&P index, respectively.  
 
 Page 14 
    where uit  =  µ i + δt  + εit    
 
To control for non-observed multiple heterogeneity, we include three different elements in the 
composite error term. µi are unobservable time invariant individuals-specific effects 
(country/sectors), δt are time-specific effects, and εit is the measurement error. The interaction 
IPR*D represents interactions between the IPR index and dummy variables corresponding to 
different group of countries according to industries’ technological intensity and countries’ 
technology capacity (W, S), to be explained in the following section. 
 
We implement a cross-sectional times series analysis, by taking industry (or country) as a panel 
unit of analysis over the period of 1994-2000. Dispersion of zero flows is important in our data:  
almost 48% of the observations on the dependent variable are zeros. Coefficients from the 
conventional Ordinary Least Squares regressions (OLS) or traditional panel estimation would be 
biased and inconsistent since they do not account for the difference between limit (zero) 
observations and non limit (continuous) observations. A solution to deal with censored data is to 
employ a Tobit Model. Assuming that the disturbance term has a normal-distribution; Tobit 
combines probability estimation with regression analysis (Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2000).25 By 
modeling as a Tobit regression (type II), it is assumed that Yit is observed for all countries’ flows, 
but Yit* is only observed (censored versions of Yit) if Yit*>0. By adding (+1) the value of one to the 
dependent variable observation we can implement the log transformation of the technology 
transfer flow. Tobit estimation is expressed:  
 ; 1 1* if               1                        
'*        where; 1 1* if     1*       :
≤+=
+++=>++=
itit
ittiititititit
YY
XYYYYObserved εδµβ
 
for i=1, ….., n (industry units);, t=1,….., 6. The random (industry) effects, µi are iid ),0( 2σN  
and ),0( iid  are 2εσε Nit  independently of µi.  
3.1 Expected Signs 
 
The strength of IPR or foreign patent rights might have ambiguous effects. It can have a positive 
impact when stronger protection expands the product space over which the exporting innovating 
                                                 
25 The main assumption is that data is censored to zero; zero reported flows are effectively observable and they are not 
due to decisions of individual firms. 
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firm enjoys monopoly power. As discussed previously, by modifying imitation costs and reducing 
consequently licensing costs, stricter IPR would increase the licensor’s profit by two main effects: 
a higher economic return from licensing (the size effect) and a higher rent share (the distribution 
effect, Yang and Maskus, 2001b). In addition, IPR should expand technology markets particularly 
in countries strengthening their IPR regimes which have a significant technological capacity 
(Smith, 1999; 2001). On the other hand, IPR protection may deter knowledge commercialization, 
“the market power effect”, when the reduction of contracting due to increased monopoly pricing 
overcomes the market expansion effect brought by the IPR reforms.26  
 
We define 3 sets of variables to assess IPR interactions. The first two sets of dummies class host 
countries’ according to their technical capacity. We code the country whether it has a strong or 
weak technical capacity according to their R&D intensity (R&D expenditures relative to GDP, 
UNESCO), above or below 0.5%, as in Smith (1999, 2001) and Mayer and Pfister (2001). By 
interacting this proxy for technical capacity with the level of IPR (column 1, table 5), we 
distinguish four groups of countries; strong patent protection with strong technical capacity, strong 
patent protection with weak technical capacity, weak patent protection with strong technical 
capacity and weak patent protection with weak technical capacity (SS*IPR, WS*IPR, WW*IPR). A 
second criterion for classing technical capacity (relative to the mean) relies on countries’ high 
technology exports. In order to take into account the absorptive capacity of host countries, we class 
countries according to the percentage of exports in high-technology products related to total 
manufacture exports (World Bank, Development Indicators).27 The interaction of these dummies 
with IPR index allows us to evaluate the imitation threat from the host countries, and consequently, 
the importance of IPR protection while considering their technological capacity. Following Smith 
(2001), we expect that imitating countries and countries with intermediate and high technological 
capabilities strengthening their intellectual property rights will attract larger volumes of technology 
services, rather than countries with low levels of technical skills and strong patent regimes.  
 
A last set of dummies classing industries according to their R&D intensity is included. A 
differentiated impact of IPR on high, middle or low technology intensive sectors should be 
                                                 
26 As reported empirically by McCalman (2001), patent harmonization can lead to significant increases in technology 
payments to exporter countries (namely, to the USA), ceteris paribus. The developing countries are found to be the 
major contributors (jointly with Canada, Great Britain and Japan). 
27 We believe that this indicator as a good proxy of absorption capacity, since it can reflect not only local technological 
skills but also countries’ integration to international technology markets.  
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expected (Fosfuri, 2000; Bessen and Maskin, 1999). Industries less knowledge-intensive are 
assumed to be less affected by the level of foreign IPR. We follow the criteria hold by the OECD 
(OECD Science and Technology, 2001; Hatzichronoglou, 1997).28 Accordingly, manufacturing 
industries are classified in three different categories of technological intensity: high technology 
(HT), medium-technology industries (MT) (grouping medium-high technology and medium-low 
technology) and low technology (LT).  Finally, industries are classed according to their sensitivity 
to IPR protection, namely, patent protection. We follow the classification followed by Mayer and 
Pfister (2001) for the French Industry. This distinction is made essentially in terms of patent 
protection.29 Separated regressions for these two groups of industries are implemented. 
 
3.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
Several control variables are considered in our model of disembodied technology trade. As a 
measure of market demand we introduce GDP per capita (GDPC) as a regressor (World Bank, 
Development Indicators, 2001). It indicates the level of economic development and should have à-
priori a positive impact on the extent of French technology services. A higher market demand 
should be translated into higher consumers’ demand for high-quality and technologies (Yang and 
Maskus, 2001a). Furthermore, IPR might be a necessary but not a sufficient condition to attract 
technology services. IPR might be valuable also when a market for technology consumption exists, 
but also when technical conditions for knowledge transfer are present (Helpman, 1993). Hence we 
incorporate as a measure of absorption capacity (HS), the human capital variable by Barro-Lee 
(2000) data on the average number of years of formal schooling of the population equal to or over 
age 15. A country with greater human capital more educated people will demand more knowledge 
                                                 
28 High-technology industries include (ISIC. 3): Aerospace, Office and computing equipment; Drugs and medicines, 
Radio, TV and communication equipment. Medium Technology groups the two classes distinguished by OECD: 
Medium-high-technology industries (Scientific instruments, Motor vehicles, Electrical machines excl. communications 
equip., Chemicals excl. drugs, Other transport, and Non-electrical machinery) and Medium-low-technology industries 
(Rubber and plastic products, Shipbuilding and repairing, Other manufacturing, Non-ferrous metals, Non-metallic 
mineral products, Metal products, Petroleum refineries and products, Ferrous metals). Low-technology industries are: 
Paper, products and printing; Textiles, apparel and leather; Food, beverages and tobacco and Wood products and 
furniture. 
 
29 Patent sensitivity classification is made according to the patent propensity: percentage of innovation that are 
patented in the French industries (Mayer and Pfister, 2001). The patent-sensitive industries are: electronic and electric 
equipment, the car industry, chemicals, fine chemicals and drugs and cosmetics, precisions and medical instruments, 
transport equipment, electronic and electric components. Patent insensitive sectors are: mechanical equipment, rubber 
and plastic products, mineral products, wood and paper and metal products. 
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services to complement its production needs and its local effort (Braga and Willmore, 1991; Lee, 
1996).30 
 
Two more refined measures of technological capacity are evaluated: R&D (UNESCO) and the 
number of patents (PAT) applied to the United States Patent Office (World Bank, Development 
Indicators, 2001). Research and development expenditure relative to GNP (R&D) reflects the 
percentage of resources by private and public institutions consecrated to innovative activity.31 The 
sign of R&D intensity and patenting by recipient countries on technology services is expected to 
be positive. Although the two indicators are valuable measures of countries’ innovation capacity, 
they indicate different stages of the innovation process: R&D is mainly an innovation input and 
patents, a measure of innovation output. They should therefore be interpreted with caution, taking 
into account the different timing they represent. 32 They are expected to show a positive impact on 
technology transfer in the sense that a technical capacity (an imitative capacity) facilitates 
knowledge absorption, and constitutes an opportunity for technology contracting, i.e. production 
alliances. On the other hand, more technologically autonomous countries could be less reliant on 
external knowledge assistance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).  
 
We include an openness index (OP) defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by the 
nominal GDP. Trade orientation of a country is assumed to play a determinant role in determining 
its propensity to innovate and consequently, its propensity to participate in technology markets. 
More open countries are better inserted in the world economy and more likely to attract economic 
transactions and enjoy an easier access to international technology markets (Maskus, 2001). In 
addition, embodied trade is frequently accompanied by arms’ length contracting, technical 
assistance, etc. According to empirical studies, the net effect is however indeterminate.33 Finally, 
we include countries’ labor (LAB) as an additional control variable. Differences in labor resource 
endowments across technology recipient countries might have a positive (negative) impact when 
                                                 
30 A negative sign would indicate substitution of local technological effort (Lee, 1996). 
31 Although the explanatory power of R&D relative to GNP could be rather limited since for a small period of time 
such ratio does not change radically, the cross-country differences remain important, particularly between emerging 
and developed countries. 
32 Patents applied to USPTO as indicators of innovative output are a good measure of countries’ technology 
dynamism (PAT). Taking this variable 4 years lagged allow us to reduce a potential problem of multicollinearity 
between these innovative indicators and patent protection. 
33 For FDI and R&D location, Kumar (1996) and Maskus (1998) concludes to a positive impact, Mayer and Pfister 
(2001) found a positive impact on French multinational location. Nevertheless, for USA, Yang and Maskus (2001) 
found that countries’ openness seems not to play a determinant role on USA receipts on royalties and licensing fees 
receipts cross borders. 
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technology licensing is conducted under a reducing-production costs perspective (Glass and Saggi, 
1998), or alternatively (negative), when it deters technology contracting by representing a weak-
capital intensive market for production (World Bank, Development Indicators, 2001). 
 
4. Estimation Results  
 
Table 5 displays the results of the random-effects Tobit model using industry-individual random 
estimation.34 As observations for the period 1994-2000 are pooled, year dummies allow for time 
specific effects.35 The use of a censored estimation procedure was necessary to account for zero 
cells in the data set (Tobin, 1958). Lastly, the Wald tests and the log- likelihood statistic at the 
bottom of the table justifies the model specification as we include more explanatory variables. 
     
The model (1) shows the basic equation without taking into account the effects of the strength of 
IPR. In the following columns (columns 2 and 3), we include the level of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) along other contracting determinants of technology transfers.  According to the model 
in column (2), the coefficient on IPR is positive and significantly. The average impact of IPR 
protection is reported in column (2). Consisting with some theoretical studies (Yang and Maskus, 
2000; Maskus et al 2003), the strength of protection of intellectual assets, i.e. patent protection, affects 
positively the extent of knowledge contracting cross borders by French Industries. As Tobit-coefficients 
cannot be interpreted as ordinary regression coefficients, multiplying the coefficients with the 
fraction reported in the last row (% censured data) of the table ensure a proper discussion of the 
estimated results. Although, significant at 1%, the coefficient of IPR indicates that a one unit 
increase of the level of IPR protection, spurs technology transfer (1.284*0.512) by 0.657 percent. 
Evaluated at the mean, one unit increase of IPR protection stimulates a volume of 1 309 047 (95 
dollars PPP) in technology-services.36 Likewise, an increase of 1% of the GDP per capita 
(5.42*0.512) should promote a 2,47% increase of receipts in technology-contracting. The 
estimated coefficients are significant to 1%. A similar strong effect is reported for French exports 
                                                 
34 The percentage of residuals’ variation ρ (0.49), from the industry-individual effects model is found to be larger and 
more significant than the one conceived by the model reposing on country-random individual effects (0.12).  
35 The log-likelihood test on the panel tobit (industry random effect) versus the pooled tobit model (Ho: whether the 
random effect is different from zero) is rejected at 1% confidence level. In the model in column (1), table 5, the 
corresponding test is: χ2(01)=  178.43, with a Prob>=χ2= 0.000 
36 For interpretation purposes, the share of the coefficients from the Tobit model, for which the transactions are higher 
than zero, is 0,512 (1-0,488). That is, more than 50% of the total variation of technology-receipts (resulting from the 
variations of the independent variables), is generated by marginal variations in the intensity of the transactions carried 
out, while less than 40%, is generated by the variations of the probability of having a transaction. 
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(embodied knowledge), a higher intensity of French trade in final products stimulates a higher 
trade in disembodied knowledge towards these countries. Countries’ technological capability 
measured by patenting at the USPTO (PAT does not show to have a determining role in 
technology-contracting. 
 
    The model in column (3) includes a non-linear term for IPR. The negative significant sign 
on the square term of IPR suggest that the strength of intellectual property rights promotes 
knowledge contracting at small increases of protection, whereas at stronger levels of protection it 
deters technology contracting.37 Thus, at very strong levels of IPR protection perverse effects arise: 
technology contracting may be reduced because technologies are commercialized at higher prices 
(monopoly power).38 It would also mean that at very strict levels of IPR protection, innovating 
firms’ are not longer encourage to license or commercialize their knowledge through contracting, 
they might prefer alternative modes of commercializing intellectual assets (exports or IDE).  
 
===TAB 5=== 
 
The column 3-4 display estimates on the sample of industrialized countries, whereas the columns 
5-6 present estimations for some developing economies. Concerning the industrialized countries’ 
sample, the coefficients on IPR and its square term (column 4) display a similar impact as in the 
whole sample. Small increases of IPR promote technology contracting from France towards its 
OECD partners. Nevertheless, stronger levels of protection appears to discourage knowledge 
contracting, and consequently, to deter the development of technology markets.  
 
Regarding the developing countries’ sample, an inversed relationship is reported: whereas without 
including the square term, IPR is found to be not significant for stimulating technology contracting 
toward these regions, a reversed effect appears when including the non-linear term. Small 
increases of IPR protection deter knowledge contracting (the monopoly power effect might 
dominate immediately economic-returns, the “market size” and “distributional” effects related to 
contracting). Nonetheless, at higher levels of IPR, technology contracting answers positively to 
                                                 
37 These results are consistent with previous empirical works, notably by Maskus (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001a) 
and Mayer and Pfister (2001) on license and FDI flows: production and knowledge transfers respond in a non-linear 
fashion to increases in patent strength. 
38 Our data does not allow us to disentangle an increase on royalties or licensing fees, the contraction might imply 
either a change of prices, or either a reduction of contracts. 
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IPR reforms. Such result implies an important aspect of IPR laws. First, modest strengthening of 
IPR laws in developing economies might not be meaningful enough to raise efficiency-gains in 
contracting, to stimulate the development of technology markets. Hence, foreign IPR proprietary 
might take profit of small changes to increase prices or shift towards IDE or trade. Larger changes 
in IPR regimes, accompanied in particular by significant enforcement mechanisms (a more 
efficient judiciary system, a decrease of corruption and bureaucratic procedures), can be more 
credible to attract technology-contracting. Lastly, a positive reaction to stronger levels of 
protection should also be dependent of countries’ technological-capacity for knowledge 
commercialization. Overall, our findings suggest that the main determinants of technology services 
receipts are the level of market demand, GDP per capita, followed by labor and our proxy of 
human capital (HS). Market openness (OP) is negative and highly significant only in the baseline 
model.  
 
===TAB 6=== 
 
Table 6 displays estimates on the technology transfer model including dummies on groups of 
countries according to their technological level, interacted with the IPR index (WS, SW, WW and 
SS). Column (1) displays estimates firstly S*IPR and W*IPR. Accordingly, stronger IPR protection 
stimulates (disembodied) technology flows towards countries showing significant technological 
abilities. Estimates in column (2) confirm and refine this finding: a stronger IPR protection 
enhances technology contracting only in countries possessing strong technical capacity (SS*IPR), 
relative to the rest of countries’ groups. Stronger IPR and a strong technical base attract larger 
knowledge flows. This result is consistent with Smith (1999) and Yang and Maskus (2001). 
Nevertheless, the coefficient of the dummies concerning countries with weak technical-capacity 
countries and strong IPR regimes (WS*IPR) is negative. Market-power effect of IPR dominates 
over the market-expansion effects in countries lacking technological infrastructure. In addition, 
countries with strong technical capacity and weak IPR represent actually an imitation threat for 
technology services commercialization.  
 
Column (3) in Table 6 reports estimates of the IPR impact across groups of industries (high 
technology, middle low and low technology intensive industries). Interactions with the IPR index 
are evaluated. Not surprisingly, estimates show that for middle high tech intensive sectors 
(MHT*IPR), IPR stimulate further technology transactions. Nevertheless, the impact of IPR in 
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high-tech industries (HT*IPR) is not significant. Knowledge contracting in high tech industries 
(instruments, optical medical telecommunications industries, etc.) depend more upon other factors 
than IPR to enhance technology markets. Certainly imitation (and reverse engineering) is not 
feasible given the high complexity of technologies and the technology infrastructure required for 
production. A high R&D investment and a sophisticated technological capacity in the technology-
recipient market might be conditional factors for such exchanges (Cohen and Levinthal, 1986). 
These findings echoes the results reported by Primo Braga and Fink (2000) on international 
trade.39 On the other hand, the interaction terms of IPR protection with middle low and low high 
tech intensive sectors (MLT*IPR and LT*IPR) shows negative and significant signs suggesting that 
tighter IPR deter knowledge contracting by French firms in these industries. Perverse effects of 
IPR emerge: stronger IPR protection allows innovating firms to charge higher (monopoly) prices, 
reducing consequently demand and knowledge-services in these industries.  
 
Industry Regressions 
 
Table 7 presents results distinguishing industries according to their sensitivity to IPR protection, 
namely to patent protection. We differentiate between à priori high IPR sensitive sectors and less 
IPR sensitive sectors. Separated regressions are conducted for each group of industries. 
 
According to estimates reported in column (2), stronger foreign IPR protection seems not to 
influence the extent of technology or knowledge contracting by French firms in patent-sensitive 
industries. Furthermore, estimates on column (2) report an absence of non-linearity either. In the 
opposite, estimation conducted on the less-patent sensitive group of industries, suggest that the 
strengthening of IPR promotes technology contracting at small increases of protection, whereas 
larger changes (stronger levels of IPR protection) provokes a contraction. Hence our results differ 
from the conclusions offered by well-known survey studies on the relative importance of patents as 
appropriability means (Levin et al 1987). In terms of knowledge contracting, industries à priori 
sensitive to patents, are not influenced by stronger foreign patent protection. A possible 
explanation of such result is that the degree of response to foreign IPR should depend on 
industries’ propensity to commercialize their intellectual assets. In other words, the effects of IPR 
should be conditioned by the effective use of IPR markets by firms (industries).  
                                                 
39 They found that IPR protection have a significant negative impact on the probability that countries trade in high 
technology industries (they found however, a positive relationship between IPR protection and total trade flows). 
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===TAB 7=== 
 
Finally, we conduct Tobit (or OLS) regressions in an industry-basis (Table 8 and 9) in order to 
identify more adequately the effects of IPR across industries. Table 8 displays estimations for 
some IPR sensitive industries, whereas table 9 reports results for IPR less sensitive sectors. These 
findings seem to be consistent with the previous result on pooled data by the nature of industry 
(IPR sensitive and IPR less sensitive industries). In the group of IPR sensitive industries, only 
three industries react to the strength of foreign IPR protection. The chemicals and the office, 
accounting and computers industry answers positively to countries’ IPR protection: a better 
appropriation of returns to innovation, stimulate IPR owners to commercialize their intellectual 
assets through technology contracting. In the opposite, stronger IPR appears to deter knowledge 
trade in the Radio, T.V. and Communications Equipment industry. Contrarily to expectations, 
pharmaceuticals, medical and precision instruments industry or the coke, petroleum and fuel 
industries are found to be indifferent to the strength of IPR protection. Weak protection of 
intellectual assets does not necessarily deter knowledge transactions in industries such as Motor 
Vehicles and Transport Equipment or the Coke, petroleum and Fuel Production Industries, since a 
set of different technical and production abilities are needed for successful imitation. 
  
===TABLE 8=== 
===TABLE 9=== 
 
In the less sensitive IPR industries, estimates show also a differentiated impact across sectors. IPR 
seems to play a significant positive role on technology contracting services in Agriculture, Fishing 
and Forestry; the basic and fabricated metal products as well as in the machinery and materials 
industry. Nevertheless, the level of IPR protection affects negatively the extent of technology 
flows in the textiles, wearing apparel and leather industries, the paper and printing industries, and 
the rubber and plastic products industries, although the latter the coefficient is not significant. 
Hence market-power effects might dominate in these industries. IPR owners contract their extent 
of knowledge contracting by increasing prices (or shifting toward other modes of production, FDI 
or trade).  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has attempted to shed further light on the impact of national differences in intellectual 
property rights on international knowledge contracting. It has pointed out the limited role of 
foreign patent protection to stimulate the transactions in technology. The empirical contribution of 
this paper has been twofold. First, this study has shown that strengthening patent protection might 
have a differentiated impact across countries. According to our results, stronger patent rights might 
not be enough to stimulate technology contracting in developing economies. Second, to the extent 
that imitation threat varies across sectors, a differentiated impact of IPR on trade knowledge has 
been identified across industries. Nevertheless, our findings show that the strength of IPR may 
have a positive impact on international knowledge contracting.  
 
IPR protection is found to be negligible to explain knowledge contracting in the high technology 
industries, although it is for middle high tech industries. Hence stronger protection is not sufficient 
to attract knowledge contracting in R&D intensive industries, whereas it might facilitate 
technology transfer in more mature industries. Finally, our results across industries differ from the 
findings reported by several survey studies about the relative importance of patents as 
appropriability mean (Levin et al 1987). In terms of knowledge contracting, industries à priori 
sensitive to patents, do not necessarily react to stronger foreign patent protection. In particular, the 
degree of response to the international reinforcement of patents will depend largely on industries’ 
propensity to tie external contracts in knowledge (exploitation of intellectual assets).  
 
Some country-policy suggestions arise from this empirical evaluation. Stronger protection of 
intellectual assets might not be enough to attract technology alliances and patent licensing with 
foreign firms. At this respect, the removal of barriers (institutional economical limited access to 
finance, etc.) both to innovation and technology markets should strengthen the incentives to 
technology contracting. For instance, the adequate supply of engineering and management skills 
increases the countries’ absorption capacity, decreasing technology transfer costs. Finally, the 
alleviation of other market imperfections (e.g. regulation of FDI and technology transfer, antitrust 
and competition policies, etc.) should strengthen receptivity of host countries to technology 
collaborations with foreigners. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Year
Royalties and 
Licensing Fees
Trademarks Know-How and 
Software
Engineering 
Consulting
Technical 
Assistance
1993 27,1% 21,4% 16,4% 10,8% 24,3%
1994 30,9% 22,5% 15,4% 7,6% 23,6%
1995 34,5% 21,3% 15,9% 8,9% 19,5%
1996 32,1% 20,3% 15,9% 9,6% 22,1%
1997 29,0% 21,7% 15,7% 9,1% 24,4%
1998 31,5% 19,3% 16,2% 9,2% 23,8%
1999 28,2% 18,1% 16,1% 7,9% 29,7%
2000 31,6% 17,8% 15,0% 9,4% 26,3%
Source : Rapports sur les Transferts Technique Internationaux , INPI.
Tab. 1
Distribution of French Receipts in Technology
 
 
Country 1994 2000 Country 1994 2000
AUT 1,3% 1,5% IRL 0,4% 1,2%
BEL 3,5% 2,8% ITA 11,5% 7,8%
BRA 0,3% 0,8% JPN 12,1% 7,9%
CHE 11,2% 6,2% MEX 1,1% 1,7%
CHN 1,0% 0,6% MYS 0,2% 0,1%
DNK 1,2% 1,2% NLD 4,3% 3,5%
ESP 7,6% 5,6% PRT 1,1% 1,8%
FIN 0,3% 0,6% SGP 0,3% 0,1%
GBR 8,2% 11,5% SWE 1,3% 1,3%
GRC 0,4% 0,3% USA 32,2% 43,3%
IND 0,7% 0,2%
Source : Rapports sur les Transferts Technique Internationaux , INPI.
Tab. 2
French Technology Receipts Allocation by Partner Country
 
 
Country Index 1990 Index 1995 Country Index 1990 Index 1995
AUT 3,32 3,86 IRL 2,99 2,99
BEL 3,9 3,9 ITA 4,04 4,19
BRA 1,84 3,05 JPN 3,94 3,94
CHE 3,8 3,8 MEX 1,63 2,52
DNK 3,9 3,71 MYS 2,37 2,84
ESP 3,61 4,04 NLD 4,23 4,24
FIN 2,95 4,19 PRT 1,97 2,98
GBR 3,57 3,57 SGP 2,57 3,91
GRC 2,32 2,32 SWE 3,9 4,24
IND 1,47 1,17 USA 4,52 4,86
Source: Ginarte and Park (1997)
Index of Intellectual Property Protection
Tab. 3
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IPR (patent) Less Sensitive Sectors 1994 2000
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0,43% 0,09%
Mining and quarrying 0,00% 0,00%
Food products and beverages and tobacco 5,37% 4,61%
Man. of textiles, wearing app., leather, harness and footwear 7,46% 1,63%
Rubber and plastics products 7,15% 8,90%
Paper and paper products, publishing, printing 0,31% 0,07%
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2,31% 0,54%
Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0,02% 0,03%
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1,36% 1,55%
Manufacture of basic metals,  fabricated metal products 1,10% 0,67%
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3,33% 1,88%
 Building and repairing of ships and boats 0,76% 0,31%
IPR (patent) Sensitive Sectors
Chemicals and chemical products (except pharmaceuticals, etc.) 3,19% 3,53%
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 12,22% 25,84%
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,69% 4,14%
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1,72% 0,47%
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments  3,98% 2,33%
Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 28,57% 22,07%
Radio, television and communication equipment  0,81% 0,26%
Others
Construction 0,34% 0,10%
Technical studies, services 4,81% 5,83%
Source : Rapports sur les Transferts Technique Internationaux , INPI.
French Technology Receipts Allocation by Industry (ISIC. 3)
Tab. 4
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1 2 3 4 5 6
GDPC 5.829 5.424 4.958 3.794 3.825 6.126 5.730
(0,477)*** (0.657)*** (0.687)*** (1.441)*** (1.436)*** (1.539)*** (1.533)***
LAB 3,512 4.401 4.702 4.365 4.763 3.194 1.994
(0,323)*** (0.413)*** (0.433)*** (0.571)*** (0.586)*** (0.849)*** (0.943)**
HS -2,095 -1.350 -0.479 -1.413 0.814 -3.563 -3.796
(0,658)** (0.794)* (0.870) (1.035) (1.228) (2.739) (2.737)
OP -0,328 1.688 1.885 2.048 3.147 2.065 1.256
(0,5367)*** (0.536)*** (0.544)*** (0.819)** (0.885)*** (1.094)* (1.135)
EXF 3,859 3,859 3,258 5,23 4,876 2,23 2,876
(0,316)*** (0,316)*** (0,387)*** (0,543)*** (0,438)** (0,543)*** (0,438)**
PAT t-3 0,043  -0.514  -0.583 -0.160 -0.107 0.365 0.555
(0.184) (0.184)* (0.187)* (0.458)* (0.460)* (0.386) (0.387)
IPR 1.284 6.952 0.872 19.316 0.868 -9.548
(0.522)* (2.370)** (0.744)* (5.626)*** (1.254) (3.871)**
IPR2 -0.888 -2.632 1.826
(0.363)* (0.795)*** (0.641)***
Obs. 2324 2324 2324 1428 1428 896 896
Groups (industries) 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ρ 0,42 0,42 0,49 0,45 0,41 0,46 0,44
Wald Test Joint Sig. 492,82 450.94*** 589.30*** 617.74*** 629.72*** 213.70*** 202.61***
Log-Likelihood -4711,83  -4904.47  -4891.82  -3078.55  -3072.95  -1769.51  -1775.08
% Censored 48,88% 48,88% 48,88% 45,87% 45,87% 53,68% 53,68%
Bilateral Technology-Services Receipts by French Firms
Tab. 5
b: Mexico,  Malaysia, Chine, India, Singapor, Argentina, Brazil.
Whole Sample
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Industrialized Economiesa Developing Economiesb
a: Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, USA, Netherlands, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland and Japan.
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1 2 3
GDPC 4.608 3.543 3.009
(0.524)*** (0.510)*** (0.542)***
LAB 3.624 2.886 2.303
(0.343)*** (0.366)*** (0.354)***
HS 3.296 3.494 1.566
(0.741)*** (0.737)*** (0.796)**
OP 2.543 0.198 -0.620
(0.536)*** (0.543) (0.576)
EXF 2.876 2.730 1.809
(0.438)* (0.678)*** (0.637)*
PAT  t-3 0.526 0.270 0.153
(0.152)*** (0.137)** (0.143)
S*IPR  2.632
(0.409)***
W*IPR -0.490
(0.368)
SS*IPR 1.309
(0.424)***
WS*IPR -2.202
(0.406)***
SW*IPR -1.493
(0.560)***
WW*IPR  -2.181
(0.506)
HT*IPR 0.025
(0.246)
MHT*IPR 1.543
(0.180)***
MLT*IPR -1.060
(0.198)***
LT*IPR -1.001
(0,195)***
Obs. 2324 2324 2324
Groups 28 28 28
Country Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
ρ 0.45 0.44 0.42
Wald Test Joint Sig. 678.39 637.95 775.35
Log-Likelihood -4429.5057 -4422.5294 -4398.508
% Censored 48,88% 48,88% 48,88%
Tab. 6
Bilateral Technology-Services Receipts by French Firms
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Tab. 7
1 2 3 4
GDPC 2.557 5.301 1.504 3.242
(0.892)*** (6.32)*** (0.618)** (0.38)***
LAB 1.546 3.088 1.805 1.837
(0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.399)*** (0.74)***
HS 1.138 0.560 2.681 1.564
(1.349) (0.46) (0.782)*** (0.65)*
OP 0.391 -0.578 -2.861 0.667
(0.892) (0.71) (0.650)*** (0.98)
EXF 3.730 2.916 1.574 1.045
(0.184)*** (0.438)*** (0.237)*** (0.637)**
PAT 0.139 0.395 0.013 -0.292
(0.182)** (2.06)** (0.169) (1.52)
IPR 2.323 5.728
(0.05) (1.55)**
IPR 2 -0.548 -1.172
(0.57) (1.39)***
Constant  -5.279  -9.362  -3.604  -7.511
(13.754)*** (6.19)*** (12.986)** (4.63)***
Obs. 913 913 1411 1411
Groups 12 12 18 18
Log-Likelihood  -2358.89  -2190.06  -2656.23  -2186.40
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
ρ 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.53
% Données Censurées 32,09% 32,09% 59,74% 59,74%
Bilateral Techhology Receipts by French Firms - Industry Regressions
IPR Sensitive Industries IPR Less Sensitive Industries
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Tab. 8
Agriculture, 
Fishing, 
Forestry
Mining & 
Quarrying
Food, 
beverage & 
Tobacco
Textiles, 
wearing 
apparel, 
leather
Paper & 
Printing 
Other 
materials 
(pottery, etc.)
Basic & 
Fabricated 
Metal Prd.
Machinery 
and 
Materials
Rubber & 
Plastic 
Products
GDPC -0.697 0.788 0.989 4.772 -3.007 1.754 -0.236 0.199 -3.117
(0.787) (0.437)* (0.523)* (0.636)*** (0.673)*** (1.035)* (0.445) (0.477) (0.686)***
LAB 0.346 -0.329 1.152 1.262 0.127 2.111 0.373 0.597 -0.250
(0.480) (0.198)* (0.262)*** (0.434)*** (0.000) (0.723)*** (0.271) (0.360)* (0.561)
HS -1.414 -2.016 -1.380 -2.645 6.252 -2.744 -0.840 -0.398 5.177
(0.554)** (0.855)** (0.476)*** (0.296)*** (1.039)*** (0.694)*** (0.522) (0.548) (0.785)***
OP 1.026 -0.814 0.847 1.182 2.706 2.254 0.341 -0.749 0.810
(0.775) (0.349)** (0.469)* (0.859) (0.813)*** (1.300)* (0.344) (0.482) (0.804)
IPR 1.547 0.375 0.119 -1.613 -5.149 0.466 0.876 1.012 -0.149
(0.504)*** (0.300) (0.298) (0.611)*** (1.635)*** (0.794) (0.434)** (0.454)** (0.593)
Observ. 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Wald χ2 53,54***  0.82*** 102,95*** 135,39*** 105,28*** 94,93*** 39,09*** 140,53*** 121,59***
% Censored 64,71% 45,00% 32,08% 79,29% 32,08% 81,43% 39,29% 38,57% 66,43%
Tab. 9
Chemicals Pharmaceut
icals
Machinery 
& 
equipment
Radio, TV 
and Com. 
Equip.
Medical, 
precision & 
opt. instr.
Office, 
account. & 
computer 
mach.
Other 
transport 
equipment
Motor 
Vehicles, 
etc.
Coke, 
Petroleum & 
Fuel Prd.
GDPC 0.458 1.422 0.551 1.700 1.696 -0.551 0.421 -0.145 0.151
(0.352) (0.492)*** (0.411) (0.478)*** (0.607)*** (0.756) (0.895) (0.567) (0.384)
LAB 0.413 1.388 0.524 1.599 1.478 -0.511 -0.754 -0.550 1.068
(0.194)** (0.224)*** (0.298)* (0.421)*** (0.337)*** (0.321) (0.228)*** (0.471) (0.308)***
HS 0.630 -0.571 0.632 1.668 -0.197 0.774 -0.717 1.201 0.945
(0.462) (0.538) (0.570) (0.638)*** (0.661) (0.554) (0.837) (0.466)*** (0.574)*
OP -0.704 0.775 0.812 1.939 1.284 -0.520 -2.694 -1.102 0.668
(0.330)** (0.485) (0.507) (0.563)*** (0.734)* (0.554) (0.387)*** (0.918) (0.436)
IPR 0.722 0.499 0.125 -2.428 -0.058 2.186 0.603 0.335 -0.437
(0.368)** (0.451) (0.404) (0.585)*** (0.504) (0.516)*** (0.585) (0.490) (0.369)
Obs. 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Wald χ2 208,42*** 235,77*** 103,26*** 70,08*** 76,38*** 77,18*** 400,97** 53,55*** 88,10***
% Censored 9,29% 20,71% 40,00% 58,57% 32,08% 17,86% 50,00% 50,00% 25,71%
Industries less sensitive to IPR (patent protection)
Industries Sensitives to IPR (patent protection)
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page 30 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Receipts in Technology (total) 2464 3065326 1.48e+07 0 3.68e+08
GDP per Capita 2464 21416.34 12959.3 400.55 45630
Exports in High Technology (%  Manuf. Trade) 2464 18.78264 13.90258 4.0266 61
Labour 2464 8.21e+07 1.84e+08 1467300 7.50e+08
Market Openess (Trade % GDP) 2352 .6965768 .4036713 .1721317 1.839983
R&D (% GDP) 1932 1.678261 .8399257 .31 3.78
IPR (Ginarte and Park Index) 2324 3.333567 .8992348 1.17 4.86
Patents by Domestic (USPTO) 2464 26314.43 76639.21 14 361090
Av. No. Years of Formal Schooling (>=15 years) 2464 2.941091 1.176487 .905 5.048
Summary Statistics
Tab. 10 
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